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Abstract
This paper argues that Russia has embarked on a difficult path to economic sove­
reignty and heightened security to withstand rising antagonism from the West that culmi­
nated with the application of punitive sanctions against Russia’s positioning on Ukraine. 
With the aim of lessening economic dependence on trade with the EU, its major trade 
partner for decades, Russia tries to work out a patriotic model of growth based on two 
vectors : import and trade partner substitution. The pursuit of self­sufficiency in foodstuffs 
adds an important pillar to security concerns as reflected earlier in the 2010 Doctrine 
on Food Security. But import substitution will be costly and difficult to manage. Fiscal 
balances and exchange rates will need to adjust to the new challenges. Finding new part­
ners eastwards is also complicated. Trade with China, in hydrocarbons or other com­
modities, requires massive infrastructural work that neither the government nor private 
investors can afford in a situation of financial stringency. Investment from China is slow 
to materialize as the economic slowdown also impinges on China’s projects. Nonetheless 
important deals on gas and infrastructure have been agreed and are pursued despite diffi­
culties. A favourable institutional framework aimed at attracting investors to the Far East 
is in place. It will be up to the local administrations to make the best of it and venture 
capital to run the risk. The outlook is long­term, but both Russia and China have learnt 
from history to be patient.
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1. Foreword on Militant Russia
The goals, strategies and agents of change in today’s ostracized Russia are 
framed into “economic sovereignty”, a concept used for the first time by President 
Putin at a Congress of the All Russian National Front (ONF) in April 2015. 
Putin laid down the context of the new policy framework. Heightened concerns 
for security in a hostile geopolitical environment required stronger engagement 
and commitment to implement the reform agenda enunciated in the 7 May 2012 
decrees . Putin admonished people in charge to neither relax, nor complain, and 
assigned the ONF the monitoring and control of plans and procedures regarding 
self­sufficiency and import substitution policies. 
Economic sovereignty fixes the paradigms of Russia’s new order — that this 
paper characterizes as Militant Russia (MR). This is an order in fieri — a patriotic 
construct that is taking shape within the corporatist framework of enhanced se­
curity concerns. By this approach, militant means assertive, vigorous, active, but 
not necessarily bellicose. Militancy in the Latin meaning of “serving as a soldier” 
is understood as the collective pursuit of the Russian nation in defence of its own 
interests and goals. Features of Russian corporatism were discernible some years 
ago (see Malle, 2013b), but developments to date add new elements to this vision. 
While the search for a national identity anchored to historical values and tradition 
is still confused and incomplete, one can observe the emergence of a “militant 
nation” under the impact of ostracism from the West. 
The semantics of Militant Russia helps highlight the vision of a nation that is not 
resigned to a subordinate role among regional powers; aims at independent state­
hood, strives to strengthen its own social and economic organizations; moves to 
fight international isolation by threading new partnerships and alliances . Used and 
abused labels of dictatorship, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, neo­authori tarianism 
are either inadequate or less heuristic compared to the characters of “militancy” in 
present­day Russia. Militant Russia is not a system, but a process permeated by 
cultural features and people’s pride in national heritage that motivate their support 
for the leadership. MR embodies a vision of social cohesiveness; commonalities of 
values and national aims. Contrary to the Soviet Union where internationalism, at 
least ideally, played an important role in framing alliances and establishing durable 
links with opposition movements in democratic countries, MR stands in defence of 
the nation’s own interests and prospects. Militancy is an irreplaceable attribute of 
defence should mobilization eventually become necessary.
In this vision patriotism, together with enhanced military and economic se­
curity, plays a primary role. Patriotism has become the symbol of national iden­
tity and readiness to defend the country for a large majority of Russians.1 While 
moderni zation cannot work “without the unifying force of civil patriotism,” in or­
der to succeed, “mobilizing” patriotism should look to the future, not to the past. 
“Owing to the radical and irreversible changes in the external environment” 
there is need for re­discussing foreign policy strategies — separately from the is­
sue of Ukraine, warns Andrei Kortunov (2015), Director General of the Russian 
International Affairs Council. Isolated from Europe, Russia turns to Asia. But 
 1 According to the opinion poll carried out 17–20 April 2015 by the Levada Centre, some 80% of Russia believe 
in patriotism and consider themselves to be patriots. http://www.levada.ru/29­04­2015/patriotizm­i­gosudarstvo.
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forging new alliances will not be easy. The Russian Far East and the Asian Pacific 
Region beyond are largely unexplored territories and impervious cultures. In or­
der not to be seen as a minor actor in the Asian countries’ race for development 
and growth, there will be need for a wise balance of militancy and restraint. 
Facing a confrontational approach at Russia’s borders with Eastern Europe, 
“economic sovereignty” policies are discussed in Moscow with focus on en­
hanced security. Underlying decision­making, security concerns demand adjust­
ments to the model of growth in which the pursuit of efficiency becomes a lesser 
priority compared to the past two and a half decades of transformation to market. 
The pillars of the new order are a tighter security approach to economic structure 
and performance, sustainable partnership linkages eastwards and the upholding 
of mutual trust between the people and the leadership. 
This paper discusses two facets of the path to economic sovereignty, each 
bearing a durable impact on the nature of the system and its foreseeable develop­
ment. Firstly, the Russian embargo on food imports and related policies are ana­
lyzed from a longer term perspective. The point is made that such an approach 
will entail economic policy adjustments unforeseen in the 2012 reform agenda. 
Secondly, the process of trade partners’ substitution is considered with focus on 
the need for Russia to find long­term trustworthy strategic partners in Central 
Asia and China as an alternative to both Eurozone and European Union count­
ries. While costly compared to former prospects of turning Russia into a bridge 
between Europe and Asia, the paper discusses whether this policy may be profit­
able in a longer term by furthering the development of the Russian Far East and 
opening new markets to Russian commodities and military exports. 
2. Framing a militant model of growth
At the 2015 April Media­Forum organized by the ONF, Putin conceded 
the economic situation was evolving compared to 2012, but contested the notion 
of crisis dismissing the importance of the “so­called anti­crisis plan”. In his view, 
despite difficulties, foreign loans were honoured and, despite falling oil prices 
and ruble depreciation, there was no economic collapse.2 Changes in the model 
of growth were not discussed; vice versa, the room for progress was emphasized. 
As a matter of fact, worrisome developments are putting pressure to adjust 
the model of growth to new constraints. This model is still based on open trade 
and free capital movements. The ratio of Russia’s foreign trade to GDP is still 
comparatively high among the emerging market economies (EME) at 41.3% 
(2010–2014 average) similar to India (41.7%), not far from China (45.0%) and 
almost double that of Brazil (21.9%).3 
Market criteria apply by and large to macroeconomic policies and the country 
has been pursuing further integration in the world economy becoming a member 
of WTO in August 2012. Sovereign funds backed up by oil revenues and pru­
dent investments in foreign treasury bills have helped the economy to fend off 
 2 See the transcript of “Media­Forum of Independent Regional and Local Media”, St. Petersburg, 28 April 
2015. http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49358.
 3 See the World Bank data sheet on Merchandise Trade in http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.
TOTL.GD.ZS.
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the worst effects of the international financial crisis, providing a cushion against 
unexpected liquidity pressures in 2008–2009. 
The repercussions on economic performance of falling oil prices and western 
economic sanctions, introduced in April 2014 and matched in August by a Russian 
embargo on imports of foodstuffs, have been painful, with a 2015 GDP fall of 
3.7%. While it is difficult to separate the impact of different factors on perfor­
mance, the official estimate of the cost of sanctions is $160bn.4 Pressures to move 
from market tools to more direct state intervention are increasing. 
The precarious balance between promoters of market reforms and conserva­
tive opposition that survived the 2008–2009 economic crisis clashes against MR’s 
priorities and ambitions. While autarky is ruled out, “economic sove reignty” is 
an eloquent rallying cry for the direction of change. The catchphrase is ambitious 
and out of reach for a resource­based economy exposed to highly variable inter­
national prices and highly dependent on western technology, but conveys the need 
for structural measures against shocks from either business cycles or confronta­
tional policies. Economic sovereignty, thus, entails cont rol on the reallocation of 
resources according to priority and a discriminating choice of economic partners. 
Import substitution is the approach to production that any company is supposed 
to be aiming to. Government and businesses must work in tandem. Powerful 
state companies and administrations are put under pressure to deliver on time and 
quality . Ministerial regulations have been approved tightening the screws on state 
entities trying to circumvent import constraints to their benefit.5 Developments to 
date suggest that this goal is pursued with determination by the authorities despite 
resistance from large companies both state and private.6 From constraint, import 
substitution has become a goal of MR for which social cohesiveness becomes 
crucial. The ONF created in 2011 and developed throughout the country under 
the impulse of President Putin may serve this purpose.7 But import substitution 
is also to make room for trustworthy trade partners out of Europe, and primarily 
in Asia. With stronger economic ties, military alliances may also develop in time 
to secure common progress. In trying to fend off the worst effect of isolation, se­
curity concerns become pervasive and condition socio­economic developments.
3.	Security	and	self-sufficiency	in	foodstuff	
Sectors that matter for security are gaining pre­eminence for policy and growth. 
These include primarily the military­industrial complex (MIC) with its research 
and development sector, the modernization of which had been planned earlier 
(see Cooper, 2015), and energy that this paper briefly discusses below in relation 
to Gazprom’s plans of supply to the East. We, however, focus on the security im­
plications of the new approach to self­sufficiency in agriculture. 
 4 Reported by Putin at the Federation Council, see http://www.rg.ru/printable/2015/04/27/putin­site.html.
 5 “Substitution has a meaning for what is necessary, not simply for what is possible” warns the government 
commission in charge of monitoring import substitution, see https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/ 
2015/05/13/importozameschenie­dolzhno­sootvetstvovat­nuzhdam­goskompanii.
 6 Indicators of performance linked to purchase and use of domestic inputs may be put in place to counter estab­
lished foreign supply linkages even if they would go against the need to reduce costs and concomitant pressure 
to achieve savings, see http://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2016/03/29/635469­soveti­direktorov­ 
goskompanii­mogut­pooschryat­zakupku­tehnologii­rossii.
 7 For a detailed discussion of the structure and policies of the ONF see Malle (2016).
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Import substitution policies have either been forced by sanctions from abroad, 
or stimulated by government restrictions on a number of imported agricultural 
products. The cost of replacing some 800 critical imports of civilian processing 
industry by 2020 is estimated at 1.5 trillion rubles (c. $30bn), of which 235bn 
(c. $4,7bn) should be financed by the state in the (optimistic) expectation that, 
due to higher tariff barriers, the largest part will be financed by private investors.8 
Observable effects to date of import substitution policies are discussed thorough­
ly by Connolly (2015, 2016). This section concentrates on their MR strategic 
aspects relative to food products.
Russia’s embargo on imports of foodstuffs came unexpectedly in the after­
math of industrial, financial and individually­targeted sanctions enacted by major 
powers in the course of 2014 to condemn the annexation of Crimea and pro­
Russian separatist fighting in Ukraine’s territories bordering Russia. The embar­
go encompassed a number of perishable products and was interpreted as a tit for 
tat measure aimed at hurting small producers in the expectation that they would 
put pressure on their respective governments to revise, mitigate or cancel alto­
gether their sanctions against Russia. 
More importantly, however, from a systemic point of view, the embargo 
forced Russian producers to put in practice the precepts of security strategies 
laid down earlier, in the aftermath of the 2009 international economic crisis and 
when Russia’s GDP had fallen by 7.8% year­on­year. Import substitution in­
cluding foodstuffs was greeted by nationalists as a long­awaited chance of eco­
nomic modernization.9 In this light, Russian counter­sanctions acquire a new 
dimension. Indeed, if conceived as a symmetrical reaction against the array of 
OECD members’ sanctions, the Russian embargo looks trivial, particularly if 
compared to the cascade effects of banning foreign airlines from flying over 
the territory of Russia or cutting hydrocarbons supplies, both discussed in 
the country and, with much concern, abroad.10 Second, in the light of the small 
GDP share of agriculture in OECD countries (less than 2–3%) and the even 
lower share of food exports to Russia, the Russian authorities would have been 
naïve to expect the embargo to be very costly, socially painful and politically 
damaging.11 Finally, one would think that the political drawbacks of a measure 
easily described as self­inflicted punishment bound to bring about shortage and 
price increase, should have been taken for granted by the authorities.12 
More plausibly, as purported in this paper, the embargo was thought of, and 
carried out, as a timely, and unduly delayed (according to some), implementa­
 8 Estimates by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, see http://izvestia.ru/news/584888. The total cost of import 
substitution is estimated at 2.5 trillion rubles, see http://minpromtorg.gov.ru/press­centre/all/#!realizaciya_
vseh_otraslevyh_planov_importozameshheniya_potrebuet_25_trln_rubley. The USD value has been estimated 
at the prevailing exchange rate at the time the regulations were approved. 
 9 See  http://www.odnako.org/blogs/komu­na­sankciyah­rasti­horosho­mi­ne­tolko­potrebiteli­no­i­proiz­
voditeli/.
 10 On airlines flight bans see http://itar­tass.com/ekonomika/1364075. The issue of hydrocarbons was dis­
cussed among specialists and neglected by media.
 11 The EU agro­food exports to Russia fell 43% from August 2014 to June 2015 (from €10.2bn to €5.8bn) 
hitting comparatively more East European countries and Finland, but still an overall modest total cost, see 
http://epthinktank.eu/2015/11/20/russian­measures­against­european­union­agricultural­products­one­ 
year­on/.
 12 For an overview, see http://newsru.com/russia/07aug2014/sanctions.html and http://www.forbes.ru/print/
node/264857.
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tion of security guidelines approved by Medvedev’s decree on 12 May 2009. 
The previous decree signed by Putin as Acting President on 10 January 2000 
in which agricultural stagnation and imports of foodstuffs were mentioned cur­
sorily as one of many possible economic threats was cancelled.13 On the basis 
of Medvedev’s 2009 decree a Doctrine of Food Security was worked out and 
approved on 1 February 2010,14 following concerns for people’s well­being and 
possible unrest during the financial crisis. In Medvedev’s decree the global finan­
cial and economic crises are comparable for their cumulative damage to applica­
tion of military force on a large scale. Food shortage was listed as a major danger 
to avert thanks to biotechnology and “import substitution of basic foodstuffs”. 
Among many fundamental concerns the consumer price level was listed third. 
The Doctrine of Food Security laid down monitoring indicators of consumption 
and production. Per capita consumption of food and calories was chosen the ob­
ject of monitoring.15 On the side of supply, together with the volume of output, 
imports of primary and processed agricultural products and fish were listed for 
monitoring. Substitution with domestic output was also discussed with regard 
to technology, machinery, equipment and other resources for the agro­industrial 
complex and fisheries. The task of examining the state of food security and 
the right to issue recommendations were mandated to the Security Council.
The Doctrine’s framework inspires today’s agro­industrial policy and is re­
ferred to when justifying state support to farms and food processing. Arkady 
Dvorkovich’s report to the government on food security late April 2015 sug­
gests that the share of domestic output of basic staples must conform to the 2010 
Doctrine’s principles. In five years Russia should achieve almost 100% food 
security in meat, vegetables and fruit, and in about 7 to 10 years in dairy pro­
ducts. The Doctrine fixes precise quotas: domestic output should provide 95% of 
consumption of grain, 80% of sugar, vegetable oil and fish, 85% of meat, meat 
products and edible salt,16 90% of milk and dairy products and 95% of potatoes.
Plans are ambitious and resources are scarce. Nonetheless, food security may 
finally have obtained priority status close to that of military output and energy. It 
is also gaining support from farmers’ lobbies.17 High agricultural subsidies main­
tained by the US and the EU for decades despite WTO’s recommendations also 
provide for food security. After decades of food dependence Russia appears to be 
aligning itself with world powers’ practice. The embargo of foodstuffs approved 
in 2014 is supposed to encourage the consumption of traditional staples, enhance 
import substitution when feasible and provide for food reserves. To counter im­
ports, including agricultural machinery and foodstuff from EU countries, through 
the members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU — see below) the Ministry 
 13 See http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/14927.
 14 See Medvedev’s legislation and provisions in http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/05/19/strategia­dok.html and 
http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/30563/page/1.
 15 Interestingly, Sergey Glaziev prepared a long dossier on food security for the nationalist Izborskii Club also 
dwelling on calories and per capita consumption, see http://www.dynacon.ru/content/articles/1725/.
 16 Import of edible salt from Ukraine was halted in January 2015 alleging sanitary reasons, see http://
rospotrebnadzor.ru/about/info/news/news_details.php?ELEMENT_ID=2967. Import was authorized again in 
May 2016, see http://www.finmarket.ru/main/article/4279534.
 17 See http://www.ng.ru/editorial/2015­05­25/2_red.html?print=Y on increasing revenues to food producers 
and their interests in upholding embargoes and http://top.rbc.ru/economics/20/01/2015/54be941b9a79473ac2a
44d29 on priority import substitution of equipment for food industry.
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of Economic Development (MED) aims at introducing import substitution policies 
in state procurement (already in place in Russia) within the EAEU.18 The authori­
ties may even consider, as they did, tax or other constraints to the export of grains to 
boost foodstuff reserves, and even destruction of illegal imports that is continuing 
in 2016. 19 If banning the import of foodstuffs aims primarily at increasing security, 
as suggested in this paper, it is likely that, no matter the fate of sanctions against 
Russia, the authorities will not hurry abolishing the embargo on basic staples any 
time soon.20 But they will need to adapt economic policy to this challenge. 
4. Security and economic policy linkages
Tougher security rules will have an impact on policies since there is a need to 
a) provide investors in agricultural output and processing with the necessary long­
term horizon; b) boost the output of primary products; c) reign in currency ap­
preciation relying on a weak ruble as a protectionist measure against imports from 
non­OECD countries instead of subsidizing farmers for which there is now little 
fiscal room21; d) stimulate the development of internationally competitive large­
scale farms and agricultural processing.22All in all, the macroeconomic policy co­
ordinates will need to adjust to security concerns at least in the short to medium 
term. Plans for 2016–2018 include subsidies to agriculture of up to 290bn rubles 
by the Federal Government and of up to 66bn rubles by the regional structures.23
A competitive exchange rate suits economic authorities and investors better 
than a strong currency.24 In this context, an appreciation of the ruble linked to an 
increase in oil prices would find the Central Bank less inclined than in the past to 
sterilize current account capital inflows to stem inflationary pressures.25 The infla­
 18 The MED’s instruction is discussed in http://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/03/04/632496­
evraziiskomu­soyuzu­importozamescheniem. On regional coordination of import substitution referring also to 
better integration of producers in the EAEU see http://economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/macro/politic/ 
20160311#.
 19 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/24/us­russia­crisis­grains­egypt­idUSKBN0K216C20141224. 
A tax of 15% was imposed on the export of grains from February to end of June 2015, as earlier discussed and 
still debated, see http://www.finmarket.ru/news/3897798/. On the destruction of embargo foodstuff approved by 
42% of Russians see http://www.interfax.ru/business/461784 and http://top.rbc.ru/politics/21/08/2015/55d7131
49a794744e36765df. 
 20 As stressed by deputy prime minister Arkady Dvorkovich charged with monitoring import substitution, see 
http://www.ng.ru/economics/2015­04­30/1_dvorkovich.html?print=Y. Medvedev on May 23 2015 was confi­
dent that Russia will expand cattle breeding to stop imports from the US, eventually using excess grain for 
the purpose, http://government.ru/news/18220/. In May 2016  Medvedev announced that 5 out of 8 indicators of 
the Doctrine of Food Security had been fulfilled, including that for meat, and self­sufficient Russia could even 
become an exporter of foodstuffs, see http://government.ru/news/22717/. He also announced on May 27 that the 
embargo will be extended to the end of 2017, see http://www.interfax.ru/business/510405.
 21 A deficit projection up to 3.7% of GDP was approved by Putin in April 2015, see http://www.forbes.ru/
news/286567­putin­podpisal­zakon­o­popravkakh­v­byudzhet­2015­goda. But in 2016 according to MED’s 
basic projections based on a $40pb oil price for Urals the deficit may increase to 5.1 % of GDP, see http://www.
kommersant.ru/doc/2911191.
 22 On producers’ pressure for depreciation, see http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian­
meat­producer­cherkizovo­plans­to­up­exports/519700.html.
 23 On cutting the share of consumer goods and services in retail from 44% to 38% of total imports projected 
for 2018, see http://government.ru/media/files/QTqv2SI5qYEuu2zOHkOAwguydbKD9Ckf.pdf; on subsidies 
see http://krasnoyarsk.bezformata.ru/listnews/prezident­i­premer­obsudili­podgotovku/35745001/.
 24 See Yakovlev (2015) on the positive effect of 1998 devaluation on recovery. 
 25 Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov reacted sharply against an unexpected appreciation of the ruble late 
April 2015, see http://lenta.ru/news/2015/04/24/siluanovruble/.
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tion targeting regime is unlikely to be brought, if it ever was, to capacity and, while 
remaining volatile, there is no sign that the exchange rate may significantly appre­
ciate any time soon, particularly after devaluation of the yuan by China in August 
2015 (see Weafer, 2015; Wolff, 2015). Thus in the foreseeable future, macro­
economic stabilisation and disinflation may be sacrificed to changing priorities.
Results to date show that imports of foodstuffs decreased remarkably, pro­
bably more due to the depreciation of the ruble and falling disposable income 
than self­inflicted embargo. Despite the sharp fall in GDP, agricultural output 
increased in 2015.26 State subsidies to the agro­industrial sector increased either 
through direct grants or indirectly through privileged credits backed by state. 
One third of the regions benefited from such schemes.27 Only time will tell how 
structurally effective such policies might have been. 
Sanctions and embargoes cannot prevent altogether trade flows through third, 
particularly if bordering, countries, as repeated skirmishing on foreign trade with 
Belarus suggests.28 But higher transaction costs help reduce the comparative costs 
of home­made staples. Improving food processing and catering of home­made 
products and fostering competition against large scale international retailers in 
the field are already occurring. Start­ups may find some state­backed support.29 
Foreign retail investors are already moving to find local suppliers. This may lead 
with luck to people’s pleasure in rediscovering traditional tastes, though there 
could be limits to food patriotism when prices grow fast.30 In some regions price 
control demanded by social organisations is already in place.31 Ceteris paribus, 
this may contribute to shortage in the short run. But the material and moral coordi­
nates of MR’s food security are in place: hardly anybody would dare to fight them. 
5. Away from Europe towards Asia 
The security approach to economic sovereignty is patriotic, but not autarkic. In 
this light, Russia’s turn to Asia is of a great significance, as noted by Russian poli­
cy advisors and quite a few dispassionate foreign observers,32 for this vision may 
 26 By 46% in the IH2015 y­o­y, see http://rg.ru/2015/08/28/import­site­anons.html with dairy products more easily 
replaced by homemade substitutes, see http://www.1prime.ru/consumer_markets/20150407/806916286­print.html and 
http://rusplt.ru/news/soyuzmoloko­zayavilo­o­pereizbyitke­molochnoy­produktsii­v­rossiyskih­torgovyih­setyah­ 
422120.html. From the start of embargo Russia reduced imports of agricultural products by $10bn, from $36,7–
36,9bn import value in 2013–2014 to $26bn in 2015, see http://www.vz.ru/economy/2016/2/19/795182.html and 
official data for foreign trade in 2015 in http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d06/35.htm. See 
official data in http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/B04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d06/64.htm.
 27 About 60bn rubles were already disbursed before the sowing period, http://www.mcx.ru/news/news/
show/37867.355.htm.
 28 On contrasts on problems of transit, see http://www.interfax.ru/business/410114 and http://www.vz.ru/news/ 
2014/12/8/719325.print.html.
 29 On the allegedly competitive fast food project Edim doma! proposed by two well­known film directors, see 
http://www.interfax.ru/business/436947.
 30  See http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/09/04/345506041/russians­react­to­western­food­ban­with­ 
pride­resignation. Overall Russians seem to have quietly adapted to import substitution and higher prices of 
foodstuffs, see http://www.levada.ru/old/16­04­2015/importozameshchenie­uma­chto­rossiyane­dumayut­ 
o­propazhe­produktov­s­prilavkov.
 31 See http://ria.ru/economy/20141204/1036612490.html; on retailers freezing prices for two months to avert 
worst measures by the government, see http://expert.ru/2015/02/27/zachem­magazinyi­zamorazhivayut­tsenyi/, 
http://tass.ru/ekonomika/1799594. 
 32 See Karaganov (2013), Danilov­Daniliyan (2013), Inozemtsev (2014a). For a view from India, see Sakhuja 
(2014). For a German view of the challenges facing Russia see Spanger (2016).
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durably effect not only the strategic allocation of resources, but also partnership 
in trade and investment and joint defence agreements. The May 2012 decrees 
focused on the accelerated development of the Far East and increased openness 
to China and the Asian Pacific Rim as a whole. Three years ago the idea of Russia 
bridging Europe with Asia appeared if not attainable in the medium to long term 
at least a far­reaching goal that both western and eastern economic partners could 
be interested in (see Malle and Cooper, 2014). This idea is now dead. 
Moving eastwards is presently a tighter concept, as it entails Russia turning 
away from Europe to give pre­eminence to deepening its foreign relations with 
Asian countries and China.33 As a point in case, it is worth noting that a free trade 
agreement between Vietnam, among the many other Asian countries that mani­
fested interest, and the EAEU has been approved by the Russian government on 
25 May 2015.34 Rather than eastwards plus westwards, as conceived earlier, this 
is a continental shift of dramatic dimensions and consequences for all. Putin and 
Xi Jinping standing side by side at the 9 May 2015 Moscow parade for the cele­
bration of victory in WWII with the glaring absence of all western leaders and/or 
high level representative officials is striking proof of the tremendous turn in foreign 
relations observable to date. This represents a milestone in smoothly developing bi­
lateral relations the pace of which accelerated as a reaction, according to a Chinese 
expert, to the strategy of containment adopted by the US, disrespect of other count­
ries’ sovereignty and NATO’s expansion to Eastern Europe.35 
The divide was initially marked by the ostensible disinclination to attend the Sochi 
Olympics by most western leaders. This decision was preceded by the condemnation 
of the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) as a revanchist attempt to recreate the Soviet 
Union, and followed by various efforts to disrupt the enlargement of the Eurasian 
integration project.36 The reasons for mounting hosti lity against Russia at that stage 
are unclear. On the one hand, projects of regional economic integration had been 
carried out by many countries earlier, including the US with NAFTA. The ECU 
project was largely based on the EU model and regulatory framework. The EAEU 
was inaugurated in 2015 as a supranational entity with equal rights for all members. 
Decision are taken by consensus at the Highest Council body.37 On the other hand, 
nationalist overtones are better assessed if compared with those of other EMEs, such 
as Turkey, for instance, or contextua lized in Russia’s transformation to market and 
peoples’ pride in recovery and growth after the painful 1990s. 
Both Sochi and ECU initiatives had been conceived at the time of high GDP 
growth rates that Russia has not yet been able to recover since the 2008–2009 
crisis and may have to be sacrificed in the years to come to the need to revisit 
the model of growth. Steps to strengthen the Eurasian Customs Union (limited 
to Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan until mid­2014) were gradually undertaken 
in the  aftermath of the crisis by a laborious process of tightening regulations on 
trade, technical/sanitary product specifications and compromises on customs’ 
 33 These developments are discussed in Malle (2014).
 34 See http://izvestia.ru/news/586678 and http://government.ru/en/docs/18216/. 
 35 “Sino­Russo Entente is more than an Axis of Convenience” was the cool remark by Trenin (2015b). 
Russian­Sino relations strengthened owing to the US’ containment policy towards both countries according to 
Li Jingjie (2013).
 36 http://www.ng.ru/armies/2014­04­23/1_nato.html?print=Y.
 37 See Treaty http://www.eaeunion.org/files/history/2014/2014_2.pdf.
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barriers and transit, while the cost of enlarging the alliance to poor partners such 
as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan turned into a reason for postponing their entry to 
better times, as was explicitly reiterated by the authorities in charge of ECU, 
rather than rushing to incorporate them, a move eventually justified by an ex­
pansionist and/or defensive strategy. The whole process of Eurasian Integration, 
originally proposed by Nazarbaev in the early 1990s, was slow, marred by uncer­
tainties, difficult negotiations with weaker but demanding partners and, all in all, 
very costly for Russia. Economic prospects from integration with more advanced 
countries and efforts at improving security in Central Asia by bribing in poor 
countries framed the whole strategy. Not a militant one at that stage.
Ukraine that had been enticed by Russia to join the ECU with a number of 
promises and privileges declined the offer in 2013 unleashing — together with 
the breakdown of government structures, political and economic linkages, 
people’s unrest and separatist movements — additional reasons for Russia’s 
acrimony against the EU and the Anglo­American community overt partisan­
ship. Russia’s altogether peaceful annexation of Crimea, after a cleverly orga­
nized pro­Russia referendum, enhanced Russians’ militant mood and passions.38 
The frozen armed conflict in south­east Ukraine is to become a permanent source 
of tensions in Europe compelling Russia not to disengage from the region (see 
for this outlook Trenin, 2015a; Ishchenko, 2015; Karaganov, 2015; Lukyanov, 
2014a). But that will not prevent a rapidly growing re­allocation of resources 
aimed at deepen ing its relations with Asia. Understandably, policies and commer­
cial agreements are driven by economic interests, but security concerns remain 
paramount primarily with regard to Central Asia (as discussed in Malle, 2013a). 
6. Divorcing the EU while chasing new partners
6.1. Central Asia
Acrimonious foreign relations with the EU and the US in particular have 
prompted Russia to speed up the enlargement of the Eurasian Union that entered 
into force on 1 January 2015 while striving to accommodate the on­going grievan­
ces of incumbent members. Pressed by Russia, on 4 December 2014 the Armenia 
Parliament approved by a large majority entry into the Eurasian Economic Union 
perfectly knowing that the country will face a number of problems with integration, 
not having completed all the necessary formal steps for accession (with eight years 
of transition period accorded to fully adapt), and will have to cope with the cost 
of lacking borders with the associated countries.39 On 2 January 2015 Armenia 
formally acceded to the EAEU with an estimated cost of €5,2 for the Russian 
budget due to a number of concessions including a conspicuous gas price rebate, 
from $270 to $180 per cubic metre.40 The accession of Kyrgyzstan has been ap­
proved, once again under Russian pressure, with full membership attained on 6 
August 2015 after a number of protocols and concessions linked to membership 
 38 See the 14 October 2014 opinion poll conducted by the Levada centre, http://www.levada.ru/eng/crimea.
 39 http://tass.ru/ekonomika/1862740.
 40 http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2015/01/16/6377985.shtml. Both the EU, with economic measures (as usual 
arriving too late), and the US tried to deter Armenia from association with EAEU. The US put pressure for 
the country to join in sanctions, see http://izvestia.ru/news/574746.
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had been signed by Heads of State of the member countries.41 The details will be 
known later. Thorny issues related to labour migration, visa conditions and treat­
ment of imports from China as well as problems with sanitary requirements for 
agricultural products are still unresolved.42 
The accession of Tajikistan, with regard to which US concerns and contrasting 
action seem to be stronger, looks more problematic.43 The closing of the Manas 
airbase in Kyrgyzstan makes access to Tajikistan’s airbases crucial for British 
and American military convoys.44 Political killings and unrest at the time of elec­
tions foment instability. President Rahmon remains a disputed — and for many 
odious — figure.45 But parliamentary elections have been held, marred as usual 
by violations of electoral rules, and Rahmon’s ruling party has won with large 
majority.46 It is unlikely that Russia may distance itself from the standing powers 
even if a temporarily silenced opposition may burst into street revolts with un­
predictable results. At the informal summit of the CIS nations that brought to­
gether the Heads of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan, Tajik President Rahmon called on his CIS counterparts to take im­
mediate measures to strengthen the CIS southern borders and jointly address 
threats and challenges emanating from Afghanistan, “since the appearance of 
Islamic State militants poses threats to all in the CIS.”47 Distancing himself from 
this position, Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbaev after the events in Crimea made 
forcefully the point that the country will not cede its  sovereignty to anyone.48 
The EAEU, indeed, has no military/security obligations towards its members. 
Nonetheless one cannot rule out that sometime in the future the threat of Islamic 
fundamentalists equipped to fight for power in the region may help coalesce 
around common security concerns Russia’s more reticent allies.
6.2. China: economic partnership and beyond
Russia’s turn to the East has been met with scepticism from abroad and warn­
ings about the dominant role that China would play in any such strategy (see Lo, 
2014; Galeotti, 2015). Russian observers are also divided regarding Russia’s rap­
prochement with China whether for historical, economic or political reasons.49 
 41 http://www.interfax.ru/russia/440813. See also http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2724492.
 42 As noted by Kazakh media, http://www.kazinform.kz/rus/article/2772993. 








 49 For different views see the following: Inozemtsev (2014b) and http://www.ng.ru/economics/2014­04­21/ 
4_silkway.html?print=Y, arguing that Russia cannot turn its back on modern/innovative/larger trade partner 
Europe and eventually should look beyond China to Japan, South Korea and other advanced Asian countries, and 
Karaganov (2013), noting Russia’s skills in networking with China, and also India, Japan and South Korea, but 
also the need to upgrade its human capital to that of advanced economies and Asia. On the importance of India, 
see http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2725653. On China’s increasing relevance after tensions with the West, see 
Lukyanov (2015a) noting that the Silk Road project was announced exactly in Fall 2013 at the time when 
confrontation between Russia and the EU over Ukraine had reached its peak. That Russia is an economic loser, 
unable to compete with China, is argued by Gabuev (2015).
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Sceptical comments were raised around the gas deal with China as soon as it was 
announced. After the conclusion of the contract and publication of few details, 
sceptics focused on the apparently high price Russia was to pay for the deal. 
Projects concerning pipelines to be built from the Far East to China also provoked 
a large number of acid comments. After the gas deal with China, the announce­
ment that a) Russia will halt gas supply to the EU through Ukraine from 2019, 
b) retreated from the ever hanging/never started South Stream project and c) will 
shift to other projects, such as the (nowadays improbable) Turkish stream also 
aroused a burst of antagonistic passions.50 Diversification out of Europe — though 
symmetrical with EU’s efforts to minimise oil dependence from Russia — was 
met immediately with warnings by EU’s officials that supply of gas from Turkey 
to Europe via Greece would not be viable and finally with EU’s anxious search 
for alternative gas routes and allegedly reliable partners in Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan. The author does not dwell on these issues, exposed to geopolitical 
turbulensce, that would require better focus and expertise.51 Two remarks are in­
strumental to this paper: a) ex ante, striking a “take or pay” deal in May 2014 for 
$400bn over 30 years at an estimated price of $350 for thousand cubic meters of 
gas,52 even if relatively costly for Russia at that time (also depending on the cost 
of new pipelines), was a major strategic breakthrough for diversification out of 
increasingly hostile Europe; b) ex post, in the light of falling and/or highly un­
predictable hydrocarbons prices (though details on contractual terms remain un­
known and possibly subject to adjustment) that may prove to be a good deal for 
Russia. At any rate, there is no indication to date that the two parties wish to recede 
from this deal. On the contrary, Gazprom seems to be pursuing original plans to 
deliver hydrocarbons through Sila Sibiri with even increased determination.53
With the gas deal Russia and China exchanged engagement rings. Not a mar­
riage, but, as also understood by the population,54 a serious commitment on both 
parties to take all steps necessary to bring the project to fruition and look forward 
to further economic and commercial partnership.55 A number of other deals have 
followed and/or are in the pipeline; the most important are large infrastructural 
projects as discussed below. These projects are costly and need an adequate hori­
zon. That of the gas deal — thirty years from now — can be taken as a benchmark. 
Implementation is delayed by technical difficulties and problems with financing. 
By March 2015 Gazprom’s special and particularly skill­intensive seismic sur­
vey at Chayanda gas condensate field was reported to have been completed with 
construction schedules under control. But seven exploration wells and drilling of 
more than 15,000 meters of rock have been planned to have a clearer idea of 
 50 More details on such issues are in Malle (2014). See also Lukyanov (2014b) arguing that the turn eastward 
is inevitable and compelled by Western attitudes to Russia.
 51 See for an expert overview, Paik (2015).
 52 http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2014/05/21/6042329.shtml.
 53 Of the Gazprom’s 2016 investment programme of 842bn rubles, about 20% (168bn rubles) are as­
signed to the construction of Sila Sibiri pipeline to China, with the plain intention not to derail and eventual­
ly cut funds to other projects in the event of financial constraints, see http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/
articles/2016/03/28/635271­gazprom­vipolnil­programmu­zaimstvovanii.
 54 On people’s altogether positive reactions see the opinion poll taken in December 2014, http://www.levada.
ru/13­01­2015/vneshnyaya­politika­rossii­orientiry­i­kritika.
 55 Bradshaw (2014) discusses the current Russian energy strategy aiming at larger volumes of oil and gas to 
the Asia­Pacific with their share in total exports rising from 12% today to 23% by 2035.
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the effective gas deposit. The new reserve estimates must be submitted to the State 
Commission for Mineral Resources for approval. Such complications may explain 
successive delays. Putin, having inaugurated the construction of the Sila Sibiri gas 
route on 1 September 2014, only eight months later ratified the project.56 While 
the deadline for completion of the first 3,200 km tranche of Sila Sibiri — Yakutia, 
Khabarosvk,Vladivostok — was originally 2017, now 2019 is evoked as possible 
target.57 Delays, however, do not suggest the project will be halted. 
Gas transport to China should become accessible from nearby Blagoveshchensk. 
This town is 583 km distant from Khabarosvk that lies in the middle of the exist­
ing pipeline from Okha (Sakhalin) and Vladivostok.58 The capacity of Sila Sibiri 
is 38bn cubic meter per year with a potential of 64bn cubic meter. The complex of 
three Far East pipelines — including the existing Eastern Siberia­Pacific ocean oil 
pipeline run by Transneft — could feed a planned LNG plant for export of lique­
fied gas to Japan.59 While the gas deal has been pre­eminent in building commer­
cial ties with China, increasing oil supply is also considered. China’s increased 
import of oil from Russia in 2014 and in 2015, despite economic troubles in both 
countries, while imports from Saudi Arabia and other potentially troublesome 
petrostates had been downsized.60 
Investments in transport infrastructure are also pursued, despite even more 
problematic obstacles due to the number of interested parties involved. A high 
speed rail­link Beijing — Moscow through Kazakhstan 7,000 km long for a pre­
liminarily estimated cost of $242bn is already planned. It should cut the jour­
ney from ten days to two and will take ten years to be realised. The cost of 
the Russian section to the border is estimated at $60bn.61 China promised to fi­
nance the Moscow­Kazan section with $6bn. Apparently investors are expected 
on the Chinese side,62 but implementation takes time and one may expect delays 
in the light of current economic difficulties. 
Though far­reaching, perhaps too ambitious, these plans seem to confirm 
Lukyanov’s (2015b) view that Russia is gradually “much more quietly than 
thought” diversifying out of Europe to the East. Both “Russia and China are look­
ing for ways to protect their own sovereignty from external influence and prevent 
political autarky turning into economic autarky as a liberal approach to internal 
development is precluded.”63 In his view Russia and China together will win their 
 56 See on timing http://www.gazprom.ru/press/news/2015/march/article220413/; on seismic surveys http:// 
www.ngv.ru/news/gazprom_zavershil_3d_seysmiku_na_chayandinskom_mestorozhdenii/?sphrase_id= 








 61 Cf.   http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2015­01­22/china­russia­plan­242­billion­beijing­moscow­rail­link.
html with Dvorkovich’s outlook six months later in http://www.rg.ru/printable/2015/08/27/ekonomika­site.html.
 62 http://tass.ru/ekonomika/1956815; http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2723633 reports the estimated cost at 
1.07 trillion rubles.
 63 This view is shared by Kashin (2014), that cites the memorandum of understanding on construction of 
a floating nuclear power station between Rosatom and the Chinese Atomic Energy Agency as a major break­
through since the issue had been hanging for years between the countries. 
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fight against isolation, a threat for both. This vision is long term. Such vision is 
necessary and may help to assuage concerns for immediate impediments while 
looking forward to laborious negotiations which each party will try to bend to its 
own advantage. 
Russia may have to sacrifice some hopes for benefits while having to bear 
the cost of development of the Far East in the expectation of Chinese investment. 
Foregone benefits might have already been suffered with the projected shipments 
of regional aircraft SSJ 100 to the Chinese market from which Russia expected 
to be the main beneficiary.64 At the same time the cost of Far East’s development 
through the establishment of territories of accelerated development (TORy) to 
which tax and other material and regulatory benefits specifically apply may well 
exceed returns in the short to medium term.65
At the meetings in Moscow cooperation in railways, banking, energy, innova­
tion and industry was envisaged. China was invited to join gas exploration in 
the Artic and Sakhalin. Cooperation in the production of microelectronic compo­
nents to be used for space projects by Glonass and Beidou and joint production 
of a large civilian helicopter were also discussed.66 Most of such projects are still 
at the stage of memorandum of understanding (MoU), a stage that could justify 
scepticism as to a happy ending (Kaczmarski and Kardas, 2015). A similar atti­
tude preceded the gas deal that in the end was signed and is being implemented. 
Mutual will and the practical feasibility of each project may still need efforts on 
both sides. 
On a broader long­term horizon, two major developments need attention: mili­
tary cooperation and economic integration.67 If successfully pursued, they may 
bring Russia’s long­term strategy and foreign policy diversion from Europe to 
a point of no return. With regard to military cooperation one notices acceleration 
and expansion of joint military exercises. With regard to economic integration, 
the proposal of a Free Trade Area between the two countries — which prima facie 
should be more beneficial to China than Russia — was raised by Putin. If pursued, 
the countries will need to build its bases from scratch. Both developments reflect 
geopolitical concerns. The presence of Fan Chanlun, deputy Head of the Chinese 
Central Military Council at the Victory Parade in Moscow on 9 May 2015 gave 
the opportunity to Minister of Defense Shoigu to stress the contribution of military 
cooperation to the strategic character of Russian­Sino intergovernmental relations. 
Joint naval exercises for the first time took place in the Mediterranean on 17–
21 May 2015.68 China has long been the major importer of Russian arms, a posi­
 64 Bilateral negotiations from 2014 aimed to deliver a few years from now SSJ 100 aircraft worth a to­
tal of $3bn to China and South East Asia. Though the Russian company remains the producer of SSJ 100, 
the final agreement suggests a division of labour that could turn more favourable to China. See on risks for 
Russia http://expert.ru/expert/2015/20/ognennyie­ob_yatiya­drakona/; and http://sputniknews.com/world/ 
20150508/1021864975.html. On location in China’ Shaanxi province, see http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/ 
2015­05/11/content_20686619.htm. 
 65 There are to date 12 TORy with 110 resident companies. But from the expected 442bn rubles ($6,5bn at 
the exchange rate end of March 2016) of investment only 287bn ($4,2bn) (two thirds) have been disbursed de 
facto while Chinese companies are slow to come, as officially reported by Iuri Trutnev, the plenipotentiary in 
charge of the Far East, http://government.ru/news/22316/. 
 66 A sign of progress in this field are orders of Russia­produced robots by the Chinese company Keysi Micro­
electronics, http://www.i­mash.ru/news/nov_predpr/77297­kitajjskaja­kompanija­keysi­microelectronics.html.
 67 These topics are discussed in Malle (2017).
 68 See http://tass.ru/armiya­i­opk/1960566 and http://www.vz.ru/news/2015/5/11/744684.html.
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tion that may be consolidated with Russia’s turn eastward. The agreement to sell 
abroad, for the first time, 24 Su­35 fighters to China for a total sum of c. $2bn, 
was reached in November 2015. Managers involved noted that the agreement 
was the result of a political decision to deepen Russia’s strategic partnership 
with China. From the Chinese side, strategic advantages in the Pacific vis­à­vis 
Japan and the Philippines have been evoked.69 The contract is expected to be 
ratified in 2016.70
Steps have been taken also with regard to economic integration. In Putin’s 
view, combining the EAEU project with the Silk Road project announced by 
Xi Jinping in 2013 during his visit to Kazakhstan and discussed with Putin in 
early 2014,71 could prelude to the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) between 
the EAEU and China. The Silk Road project is being cautiously pursued by 
China in an attempt to deepen its expansion to Central Asia and gain support 
from EAEU member countries to further penetrate into the European market. 
Both the Silk Road and the FTA with China sound fanciful in the present context. 
The effective locations of the Silk Road have not yet been decided. China is also 
mulling the idea of a revised Maritime Silk Road that would help its economic 
expansion into the ASEAN (Tiezzi, 2014, 2015).
The outlook is long­term. In the best of circumstances the FTA will not be at­
tainable earlier than 2025–2030.72 Despite the apparently eccentric character of 
such proposals in a difficult time marked by impressive slowdown in China and 
recession in Russia, for Russian officials even a framework cooperation agree­
ment signed at the highest level would be a break­through as it would make mu­
tual trade flows more transparent and elicit business interest.73 There is hope that 
joint projects could benefit from the Silk Road Fund and the recently established 
Asian Bank for Investment in Infrastructure.74 
Both Russia and China look beyond their joint partnership initiative. Russia to 
Japan and South Korea, and further to Vietnam and India in Asia, but also to other 
continents; China to all ASEAN and further to the West, to Europe. The interests of 
Russia and China do not overlap, and may even diverge in time. Pressures against 
liberalizing access to land for agricultural or industrial use are coming to the surface 
interfering with state projects. Hard core nationalists are suspicious of China and 
many fear China’s expansion in the Far East.75 Militant Russia will have to show re­
straint in committing to further integration. But in the foreseeable future both Russia 
and China will focus on Asia. It is in their interest to cooperate rather than compete. 
In a world of tumultuous changes, Europe and the US remain in the shade. 
 69 See http://rg.ru/2015/11/19/su35­site.html and http://vz.ru/news/2015/11/19/779136.html.
 70 The transfer of sophisticated military technology to China may be a source of concern in some Russian 
circles , see http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/11/141110_new_fighter_su35_china_russia. Effective supply 
may take time. According to Sergei Chemezov, the head of Rostech, delivery will not start before 2017, see http://
www.ng.ru/news/535300.html?print=Y.
 71 In February 2014 the two leaders agreed on connecting the Silk Road with Russia’s Euro­Asia Railways. 




 74 See http://government.ru/media/files/QTqv2SI5qYEuu2zOHkOAwguydbKD9Ckf.pdf.
 75 On restrictions to the sale of land to foreigners proposed by the Russian Ministry of Agriculture see https://
www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2015/08/30/606807­russkaya­zemlya­dlya­rossiyan. For a nationalist view 
calling for prudence, see http://www.vz.ru/politics/2015/5/19/745927.print.html.
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7. Concluding remarks
Russia is engaged on a process of political and economic transformation in the di­
rection of a model of “economic sovereignty”. This process is linked to economic 
and political ostracism enacted in 2014 against the country by major international 
powers as a consequence of developments in Ukraine. While the country rejects 
 autarky, and is determined to maintain large openness to foreign trade as demanded 
by its economic structure, a selective approach to partnership is being developed. 
This paper discusses the current process as Militant Russia — an order that ema­
nates out of a blend of patriotic sentiments and security concerns. While policies are 
still based by and large on a market approach, major concerns regarding the policy 
of containment and isolation from international markets are laying the ground for 
a pervasive security approach to growth and development. In this context, MR re­
discovers in culture and history its own values and identity of which to be proud.
Two elements of the Russian “sovereign economy” have been discussed in 
this paper: enhanced import substitution in areas of concern to security; increased 
focus on Asia for the re­direction of commercial flows and establishment of new 
partnerships. Both need militant support from society that cannot be taken for 
granted and will need policy determination on the part of the authorities.
Some preliminary conclusions are drawn. First, food security is being up­
graded to priority for the first time, complementing military and energy secu­
rity. The Russian embargo on basic foodstuffs and agro­processing technology 
is primarily a means to achieve self­sufficiency in targeted areas no matter how 
costly. Second, Russia’s turn to Asia is planned to last but will need to be sus­
tained by appropriate strategies. The path is insidious and fraught with problems, 
but to a large extent is obligatory. Some steps have already been taken for the di­
versification eastwards of gas and oil supply, despite overwhelming skepticism 
at home and abroad; other policies are at the stage of MoU and/or preliminary 
agreements that will need further negotiations before being implemented. A Free 
Trade Area between Russia and China is being discussed between high level 
Russian and Chinese officials, while a number of Asian countries manifest their 
interests in the existing five member­Eurasian Economic Union that went into 
force on 1 January 2015 or other FTA structures. 
The militant path to economic sovereignty is likely to produce fundamental 
changes to both state organization and the model of growth. A lower dependence 
on the West combined with stronger ties with the APR and China will need to be 
built almost from scratch and be made sustainable. Changes will take time and be 
costly. All the more, to be endurable, they need to be based on a security approach 
to new partnerships and people’s sustained empathy. The perception of any new 
threat can only reinforce Militant Russia. The analysis of these developments 
suggests that Russia may rapidly, albeit painfully, reach a point of no return to 
past economic relations and political alliances.
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